



“Tell Me What Shall Arise”: Conflicting Notions of the 
Resurrection Body in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Egypt 
 
Hugo Lundhaug 
University of Oslo 
 
Abstract:  
In the turmoil around the turn of the fifth century, controversy 
over the legacy of Origen took center stage, and questions 
regarding the nature of the resurrection were among the main 
points of contention. What was the nature of the resurrection 
body? In what sense will post-resurrection life represent a 
continuation or a break with the present one? How are key 
scriptural passages, such as 1 Cor 15 to be understood? What is the 
role of ritual or ascetic practice? This essay shows how, when 
compared with more well-known players of the controversy, two 
texts from the Nag Hammadi Codices and writings by the powerful 
Upper Egyptian abbot Shenoute of Atripe may give us additional 
insight into how these questions were debated. It is argued that on 
the level of phrases, terminology, and allusions there is much 
agreement, while important disagreements regarding how to 
conceptualize the resurrection leads to distinctly different 
interpretations of the key biblical texts. And while creeds were introduced to curtail certain interpretations, they 
also led to new interpretations, as creedal phrases were also redefined and reinterpreted to suit the preferred 
conceptual models of different interpreters. 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE 
In a polemical letter targeting his former friend Rufinus, Jerome 
complains that there are some who claim to believe in the 
resurrection of the body without actually believing in it. According 
to Jerome, “they use the word ‘body’ instead of the word ‘flesh’ in 
order that an orthodox person hearing them say ‘body’ may take 
them to mean ‘flesh,’ while a heretic will understand that they 
mean ‘spirit’” (Jerome, Ep. 84 [= 84.5 in NPNF2]).2 In this letter 
from 399, Jerome is thus accusing Rufinus and others of willfully 
redefining key terms to suit their own heretical notions, allowing 
them to keep using seemingly orthodox phrases, while disagreeing 
with their intention. Rufinus defends himself, however, by stating 
that what rises in the resurrection “will be this very flesh in which 
we now live.” He says it is not true “as is slanderously reported by 
                                                 
1 This article was written under the aegis of project NEWCONT (New 
Contexts for Old Texts: Unorthodox Texts and Monastic Manuscript Culture 
in Fourth- and Fifth-Century Egypt) at the University of Oslo. The project is 
funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) / ERC Grant 
agreement no 283741. 
2 Translation of Jerome is from Dewart (1986, 145). For all primary 
sources throughout this essay, the embedded hyperlinks connect to open-
access scholarly editions, many of which are now dated. While these offer the 
reader ease of reference, preference should always be given to the more recent 
scholarly editions/translations noted throughout the essay. 
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some men” that he believes “another flesh will rise instead of this.” 
On the contrary, he affirms a resurrection of “this very flesh” 
(Rufinus, Anast. 3–4; cf. Apol. Hier. 1.9).3 It is clear that while 
words and phrases were being redefined, what mattered to the 
contestants was not just the phrases used, but also the concepts 
through which they were understood. 
The debate between Jerome and Rufinus was part of the 
controversy over the legacy of Origen in the late fourth and early 
fifth centuries. The resurrection was a hot topic in this controversy 
(e.g., Clark 1992, 3, 5, 8, 12; Kelly 1955, 150 n. 268; Russell 2007, 
25–26), and the anti-Origenists agreed that Origen and those 
inspired by him denied bodily resurrection.4 While Jerome and 
Rufinus were notable participants in the debate, the Origenist 
controversy raged hardest in Egypt, and well before Theophilus of 
Alexandria turned against the Origenists at the turn of the fifth 
century, the staunch anti-Origenist heresiologist Epiphanius had 
noted opposition to the idea of the resurrection of the body among 
the monks of Egypt, as well as in the writings of Origen himself 
(Dechow 1988). In his first major heresiological writing, the 
Ancoratus, Epiphanius says that the Origenist monks in the Thebaid 
“think like the Hieracites” and believe in “a resurrection of our 
flesh,” but do not interpret it to mean a resurrection of this material 
flesh, but rather of “another in its place” (Anc. 82.3]).5 Hieracas, 
                                                 
3 Translations of Rufinus’s Apologia adversus Hieronymum are from 
Dewart (1986). 
4 Shenoute and Theophilus extend this complaint to include a denial of the 
real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist.  
5 Indeed, in the Life of Epiphanius, this notion is attributed to Hieracas of 
Leontopolis as well, a figure he describes in the Panarion as being “awesome 
in his asceticism, and capable of winning souls over to him” (Pan. 67.1.6). 
According to Epiphanius (Pan. 67.1.6), “many Egyptian ascetics were led 
astray by him,” although he predictably claims that Hieracas’s followers were 
not as sincere in their asceticism as their master. While “Hieracas himself 
really practiced considerable asceticism,” claims Epiphanius (Pan. 67.3.8), “his 
disciples after him do it as a pretense.” Epiphanius elsewhere connects the 
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Epiphanius claims, “took the cue for his denial that the resurrection 
of the dead is a resurrection of the flesh from Origen—or spat this 
up out of his own head” (Pan. 67.1.6).6 According to Epiphanius, 
Hieracas “says that there is a resurrection of the dead but that it is a 
resurrection of souls, and also tells some fairy story about ‘spirit’” 
(Pan. 67.2.8).7 Epiphanius counters the notion of a resurrection of 
the soul by stating that “We cannot speak of the ‘rising’ of 
something that has not fallen” (Pan. 67.6.1). In his mind this rules 
out the soul, for “a soul neither falls nor is buried” (Pan. 67.6.2). 
Epiphanius uses the same argument against Origen himself: 
“there is no resurrection of souls, which have not fallen; but there is 
a resurrection of bodies, which have been buried” (Pan. 64.63.12; cf. 
Pan. 64.63.10), and adds that in any case resurrection must apply to 
the whole body: “There cannot be parts of the body which are raised, 
and parts which are laid to rest and left behind” (Pan. 64.63.13). It is 
evident that the integrity of the body in the resurrection was 
important to Epiphanius, but this did not mean that he thought that 
the body would remain constant and unchanged. He is adamant that 
the resurrection is not a resurrection of the soul only, or of a 
resurrection body without flesh, but neither is he imagining a 
resurrection body that is exactly the same as the body that died. 
What he envisions is a resurrection body that, while being a risen 
form of the buried body, is in fact a spiritual body consisting of 
spiritual flesh (Pan. 64.64.1–9), indeed “a spiritual flesh that will 
never again have needs,” as he puts it, citing the example of Elijah 
(Pan. 64.64.2). Here Epiphanius also brings in the example of 
Christ’s resurrection body, arguing that “the ensouled body is the 
same as the spiritual body, just as our Lord arose from the dead, not 
by raising a different body, but his own body and not different from 
                                                                                                                      
Melitians to the Hieracites, saying that Melitus was both a contemporary and 
successor of Hieracas (Pan. 68.1.1). 
6 Translations of Epiphanius’s Panarion are from Williams (1994); of 
Ancoratus are my own. 
7 Cf. Epiphanius, Pan. 67.1.5: “Hieracas too believes that the flesh never 
rises, only the soul. He claims, however, that there is a spiritual resurrection.” 
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his own.” The reason why Christ could pass through closed doors, 
Epiphanius argues, was because “he had changed his own actual 




The polemics brought to bear by Epiphanius against Origenist 
conceptions of the resurrection are also reflected in Coptic sources. 
One prominent Coptic author who read Epiphanius’s writings with 
great interest was Shenoute of Atripe,8 the famous abbot of the 
White Monastery near modern day Sohag in Upper Egypt.9 
Shenoute confronts the Origenists and their heretical teachings on 
the resurrection in several places. In the partly preserved writing 
known as Who Speaks Through the Prophet, Shenoute confronts the 
idea that another flesh will arise in place of the material one at the 
resurrection, together with other erroneous notions of the 
resurrection, including those of the pagans and Manichaeans. 
The introduction to the section where Shenoute deals with those 
teachings that have an Origenist flavor to them is unfortunately lost 
in a four-page lacuna, but where the manuscript witnesses pick up, 
Shenoute is arguing against some people who claim that “‘it is 
another body that shall sprout up in that very body on the day of the 
resurrection,’ and ‘this very body shall rot away and perish and it 
shall not at all come into being (again) after the other new body 
sprouts up [in] it’” (Who Speaks Through the Prophet, DD 80).10  
Interestingly, Shenoute here shows his opponent arguing on the 
basis of the seed metaphor of 1 Cor 15 while taking issue with Paul’s 
                                                 
8 On Shenoute’s use of Epiphanius, see Timbie 2007, 627–28. 
9 For a convenient short introduction to the life and importance of 
Shenoute, see Emmel 2004, 1:6–14. 
10 I cite works of Shenoute using a two-letter code for the White 
Monastery manuscript cited (following Tito Orlandi’s Corpus dei Manoscritti 
Copti Letterari [CMCL] project and database, and listed in Emmel 2004, 
1:xxiii–xxiv), followed by manuscript page number. All translations are my 
own. DD 80 is unpublished and has been read from a photograph kindly 
provided by Stephen Emmel. 
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own interpretation of it, stating that “I do not see that the grain of 
wheat dies. It became earth and the straw came out of it” (Who 
Speaks Through the Prophet, ZM 59). Shenoute also quotes this 
person saying that “there is another body that comes on the day of 
the resurrection, and this one which we are in now becomes earth, 
and will not at all come into being (again)” (Who Speaks Through 
the Prophet, ZM 59–60),11 thus prompting Shenoute to quote Paul, 
saying “You fool! What you sow does not live unless it dies. And it is 
not the body that shall come into being that you sow, but it is a 
naked grain of wheat or some other seed. God gives it a body as he 
wished” (Who Speaks Through the Prophet, ZM 60, citing 1 Cor 
15:36–38). While Shenoute’s interlocutor claims that “it is another 
body that will sprout up in this one” (Who Speaks Through the 
Prophet, DD 83),12 Shenoute counters by arguing that “it is this very 
body that shall rise in the resurrection” (Who Speaks Through the 
Prophet, ZM 60). He continues by somewhat disingenuously 
pointing out that Scripture does not explicitly state what his 
opponent understands Paul to be saying: “we read in the Scriptures 
that the dead shall rise,” he says, “we have not read that it is another 
body that will sprout up in the bodies of the dead” (Who Speaks 
Through the Prophet, DD 83). Shenoute indeed continues this line 
of scriptural argumentation at some length, citing numerous 
passages where something “sprouting up” from the dead body is not 
mentioned. One of these is the example of Lazarus: “Lazarus who 
arose on his fourth (day). Did another body sprout up in the dead 
body and come out and abandon the dead lying in the tomb? Was it 
not the smelly body that arose?” (Who Speaks Through the Prophet, 
ZM 63;13 cf. John 11:39–44). For Shenoute, “it is this very body that 
shall arise, not in weakness, not in shame, but in glory according to 
the Scriptures” (Who Speaks Through the Prophet, ZM 64–65;14 cf. 
                                                 
11 ZM 59–60 is published in Amélineau 1907–1914, 2:191–92. 
12 DD 83 is unpublished and has been read from a photograph kindly 
provided by Stephen Emmel. 
13 Coptic text in Munier 1916, 136. 
14 Coptic text in Munier 1916, 137 + Wessely 1909–1917, 5:127. 
 
Coming Back to Life 
 - 220 - 
1 Cor 15:43), and he makes clear that “no other body shall arise in 
place of this body, nor shall any other body sprout up in this body” 
(Who Speaks Through the Prophet, ZM 64).15 Nevertheless, 
although he is adamant that it is the dead and buried body that shall 
also arise, he does reckon with a transformation of the body, as is 
clear from another writing of his, where he follows 1 Cor 15:52 and 
Phil 3:21 in saying that “the Lord and his saints have raised others, 
signifying the great resurrection of the day when he shall sound the 
trumpet and the dead shall rise incorruptible. And as for us, we shall 
change, as it is written: ‘this one who shall change the body of our 
humility into the likeness of the body of his glory’” (Shenoute, I Am 
Amazed, 390 = HB 41).16  
The nature of the resurrection body is described in yet another 
text, entitled Good is the Time for Launching a Boat to Sail, where 
he explicitly states that “it is as a spiritual body that you will arise” 
(Leipoldt 1906–1913, 4:190).17 Despite this emphasis on change, 
Shenoute is nevertheless concerned about bodily integrity in the 
resurrection, as is evident when he states elsewhere in the same text, 
perhaps in conscious rejection of Gos. Thom. 22 or 114 (cf. Layton 
and Lambdin 1989, 62–63, 92–93), that in heaven “the male as male 
and the female as female all exist together in the kingdom of Christ” 
(Good is the Time for Launching a Boat to Sail; Leipoldt 1906–1913, 
4:191). 
 
III. THE TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION 
From the archimandrite of Atripe we turn south to the manuscripts 
known as the Nag Hammadi Codices and two texts that circulated 
                                                 
15 Coptic text in Munier 1916, 137. 
16 In citations of I Am Amazed I use the numeration scheme established by 
Orlandi (1985) and followed by Cristea (2011) in addition to the manuscript 
and page number. The Coptic text consulted is that of Cristea (2011, 166 = HB 
41); translations are my own. 
17 For Good is the Time for Launching a Boat to Sail I cite the page 
number in the Leipoldt (1906–1913) edition of the Coptic text. 
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among fourth- and fifth-century Egyptian monks.18 The first, 
entitled the Treatise on the Resurrection and preserved in Nag 
Hammadi Codex I, is styled as a letter by an unnamed author to a 
person named Rheginos, addressed as “my son,” together with his 
“brothers.”19 The text sets out to explain the nature and significance 
of the resurrection, since there are many who do not believe in it 
(Treat. Res. 44.8–9).  
First of all, the resurrection should not be doubted (Treat. Res. 
47.2–3), and should not be regarded as “a fantasy” (Treat. Res. 
48.10–13). But what is it? The explanation given is complicated, and 
unfortunately presented in relatively cryptic terms, as the (implied) 
writer of the letter acknowledges, stating that “I know that I am 
presenting the solution in difficult terms,” although he tries to 
reassure Rheginos by saying that “there is nothing difficult in the 
word of truth” (Treat. Res. 44.39–45.4).20 The treatise affirms that 
“the dead shall rise” (Treat. Res. 46.7–8), but this is not the kind of 
resurrection advocated by Shenoute or Epiphanius, for we are told in 
no uncertain terms that the present physical body will be left behind 
(Treat. Res. 47.34–35), and that “the visible members” shall not be 
saved (Treat. Res. 47.38–48.1). “What, then, is the resurrection?” 
(Treat. Res. 48.3–4).  
Importantly, despite the dismissal of a resurrection of “the visible 
members,” the text nevertheless operates with the concept of a 
resurrection of the flesh. Rheginos is told that even “if you did not 
(pre-)exist in flesh, you received flesh when you came into this 
world. Why shall you not receive flesh when you ascend into the 
aeon?” (Treat. Res. 47.4–8). The Treatise on the Resurrection thus 
argues that we receive flesh in connection with our entry into this 
                                                 
18 For the monastic provenance of the Nag Hammadi Codices, see 
Lundhaug and Jenott 2015.  
19 The Treatise on the Resurrection is the actual subscript title of the text 
in the only manuscript in which it is preserved. I have used Malcolm Peel’s 
(1985a) edition of the Coptic text. Translations are my own. 
20 For a detailed analysis of the resurrection theology of the Treatise on the 
Resurrection, see Lundhaug 2009. 
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world, and therefore we should logically also receive flesh when we 
leave this world and enter into the next.21 Why is this logical? It is 
logical on the basis of the main conceptual metaphor underlying the 
text’s understanding not only of the resurrection, but also of the 
nature of this present life and of death. In fact, the text seems to 
conceptualize this earthly existence in terms of the conceptual 
metaphor of a pregnancy, and death is understood as a birth 
(Lundhaug 2009). This is seen especially clearly when the text 
elaborates on the LIFE IS A PREGNANCY metaphor, stating that “the 
χόριον of the body is old age.” The term χόριον does not have any 
direct English equivalent, but can denote both the membrane that 
surrounds a fetus in the womb, and this membrane together with 
the entire afterbirth. Both these aspects of the χόριον are important 
in the elaboration of this conceptual metaphor in the Treatise on the 
Resurrection—both the membrane that the baby has to pass through 
and come out of at birth, and the afterbirth, which is discarded at 
birth as the newborn baby no longer needs it. “The χόριον of the 
body is old age,” states the Treatise on the Resurrection, and 
explains that “you exist in corruption having the deficit as a profit. 
For you shall not give (away) that which is better when you depart” 
(Treat. Res. 47.17–22),22 thus implying that what is discarded is 
simply that which is no longer needed. Indeed, Rheginos is 
reassured that everything that really constitutes us will be saved 
                                                 
21 Cf. Peel 1985b, 179. Contrary to Bentley Layton (1979, 77), I do not 
interpret this passage as a “dialogue between the author and an imaginary 
interlocutor . . . in which the lecturer himself adduces possible objections and 
then answers them.” From this premise Layton translates rather freely as 
follows: “Now (you might wrongly suppose) granted you did not preexist in 
flesh—indeed, you took on flesh when you entered this world—why will you 
not take your flesh with you when you return to the realm of eternity?” (23). 
Peel (1985b, 179) argues that the passage is “addressed straightforwardly by 
the author to Rheginos,” and characterizes Layton’s translation as “a 
tendentious effort to make the text conform to orthodox Middle Platonic 
teaching about survival of the bare soul after death.”  
22 The text is here drawing on the conceptual metaphor DEATH IS 
DEPARTURE. 
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(Treat. Res. 47.24–27). So, what is it that is actually saved, and what 
is discarded? 
The metaphor of the χόριον is also employed by Origen in his 
Contra Celsum. The way he uses it, however, is as a metaphor for 
the body itself (Cels. 7.32; cf. Peel 1985b, 182). Using the term 
specifically in its sense of afterbirth, in Origen’s usage it denotes 
simply that which is discarded. While scholars have suggested that 
the usage in the Treatise on the Resurrection is similar (Peel 1969, 
84; cf. Peel 1985b, 182; Lona 1993, 225), there are in fact important 
differences. Origen explains that when a baby is born it puts on a 
new body suitable for its new existence, but discards the χόριον, 
which is no longer necessary. Origen uses this to explain the 
resurrection, stating that the soul “at one time puts off one body 
which was necessary before, but which is no longer adequate in its 
changed state, and it exchanges it for a second; and at another time 
it assumes another in addition to the former, which is needed as a 
better covering, suited to the purer ethereal regions of heaven” (Cels. 
7.32).23 Like Origen, the Treatise on the Resurrection is clearly 
working with the same conceptual framework of pregnancy and 
birth, but Origen’s metaphorical use of the χόριον is only superficially 
similar to that of the Treatise on the Resurrection, for in contrast to 
Origen, the Nag Hammadi text does not use χόριον as a metaphor for 
the body as such, but rather as a metaphor for old age. It is old age 
that is “the χόριον of the body.” Thus the body cannot itself be the 
χόριον. Instead, the χόριον is a metaphor for the bodily effects of 
aging. “Rheginos” is in effect told not to worry about having to arise 
in the same old body that dies, but rather in a new one, once old age 
is broken through and left behind through the metaphorical birth 
that is the death of the visible body.24 And in contrast to Origen, the 
Treatise on the Resurrection also plays on the metaphorical 
implications of the membrane-aspect of the χόριον, indicating the 
boundary that is broken through at death. 
                                                 
23 Translations of Origen are from ANF. 
24 For the use of the conceptual metaphor DEATH IS BIRTH elsewhere in 
Coptic literature, see, e.g., the Dormition of Mary (Sellew 2000, 58, 67). 
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The Treatise on the Resurrection is in agreement with Origen, 
however, with regard to the nature of the pregnancy prior to the 
metaphorical birth constituted by the death of the material body. 
What is gestated is the resurrection body, a resurrection body that is 
explained in terms of an inner human being—an inner man.25 This 
resurrection body is born when the material body dies, but needs to 
be cultivated in this life. As the Treatise on the Resurrection explains 
it, the resurrection is to be understood as “the uncovering of those 
who have arisen,” which can be understood as a reference to the 
uncovering of the already risen “inner man” at the shedding of the 
external material body at death. 
The resurrection body is envisioned in relatively concrete terms, 
and the Treatise on the Resurrection speaks about the “living 
members,” and “the visible members,” and the reception of new 
“flesh.” The letter explains to “Rheginos” that “you received flesh 
when you came into this world,” and rhetorically asks: “Why shall 
you not receive flesh when you go up into the eternal realm?” (Treat. 
Res. 47.5–8). But what is the nature of this new “flesh” that one will 
receive when leaving this world? The reference to two different, but 
conceptually analogous, “receptions” of flesh, one at birth and the 
other one at death, is similar to Origen’s description in Contra 
Celsum, and as Origen speaks of a new body for the soul that is fit 
for life in heaven, the Treatise on the Resurrection indicates that the 
new flesh is indeed different from the old.  
The Treatise on the Resurrection does not so much distinguish 
between flesh and spirit as between the internal and the external, the 
visible and the invisible, the perishable and the imperishable. The 
treatise envisions bodies constituted by internal, invisible, living 
members and bodies constituted by external, mortal, visible 
members. Both of these bodies have flesh, but different kinds of 
flesh—one associated with this present world, and another 
associated with the next. The view that the material this-worldly 
flesh shall arise is directly opposed, but the resurrection nevertheless 
involves a new kind of “flesh” that emerges as the flesh of an inner 
                                                 
25 This is clearly based on an interpretation of 2 Cor 4:16–18.  
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embryonic body that needs to be cultivated in the present life. At the 
death of the material body, it is this perfectly cultivated inner body 
that will ascend.  
How should this inner body be cultivated? “Rheginos” is told 
that he should not “live in accordance with this flesh” (Treat. Res. 
49.11–12), by which the text refers to the this-worldly material body. 
What does this imply? How should one conduct oneself? “Rheginos” 
is not only told that he should realize that he has already risen, 
stressing the importance of faith, but he should also “practice 
asceticism (    ⲉ ) in a number of ways” so that “he will be let loose 
from this (material) element” (Treat. Res. 49.32–33). So the 
gestation of the inner man, or cultivation of the resurrection body, 
seems basically to require faith and ascesis, as well as (to stay within 
the text’s main metaphor) some form of prior conception of the 
resurrection body in this life. The latter is not further specified in 
this text, but is likely to be of a ritual nature. Indeed, conception and 
birth metaphors are common in baptismal texts of this period (see, 
e.g., Johnson 2001), and baptismal initiation would certainly fit the 
context here as well, as the time when the inner resurrection body is 
conceived, whereupon the rest of the earthly life of the Christian 
could be regarded as a pregnancy that terminates with the birth of 
the resurrection body at death.  
 
IV. THE GOSPEL OF PHILIP 
One text in which the ritual aspect is an integral part of the 
resurrection theology is the Gospel of Philip in Nag Hammadi Codex 
II.26 Like the Treatise on the Resurrection, the Gospel of Philip is 
trying to define the correct way of understanding the resurrection 
and the resurrection body.27 Interestingly, the Gospel of Philip does 
so by distancing itself from, on the one hand, an understanding of 
the resurrection that, according to the anti-Origenist church fathers, 
                                                 
26 For an edition of the Coptic text of the Gospel of Philip, see Lundhaug 
2010. 
27 For detailed treatments of the Gospel of Philip’s understanding of the 
resurrection, see Lundhaug 2010, 2013. 
 
Coming Back to Life 
 - 226 - 
is close to that of Origen, and, on the other hand, from a Shenoute-
like emphasis on the resurrection of the same body that died.  
Thus the Gospel of Philip argues against people who believe in 
the resurrection of the material body, who are described as those 
who are afraid to “arise naked,” but it also argues against those who 
deny a resurrection of the flesh altogether, who say that “the flesh 
will not arise.” The latter apparently do advocate some kind of 
resurrection, but not of “flesh,” prompting the Gospel of Philip to 
ask its interlocutor to “tell me what it is that will arise,” before 
proceeding to reject the idea of a resurrection of either a “spirit in 
the flesh” or a “light in the flesh.” The Gospel of Philip cannot 
accept these solutions and closes its argument by stating that “it is 
necessary to arise in this flesh, for everything is in it” (Gos. Phil. 
56.26–57.19).  
“It is necessary to arise in this flesh” (Gos. Phil. 57.18). This 
sentence provides us with the key to understanding the resurrection 
theology of the Gospel of Philip. It is a polemical statement that 
clearly emphasizes the necessity of arising “in this flesh,” at least in 
some sense. But how should this statement be interpreted, when we 
take into consideration the text’s rejection of the resurrection of the 
material body? For the text ridicules those who are afraid to rise 
naked, who do not realize that they are the ones who are naked. 
What these people are afraid of is to arise without their material 
bodies, which is why they “wish to arise in the flesh” (Gos. Phil. 
56.26–29). This argument may give the impression that the Gospel 
of Philip is actually against the resurrection of the flesh. It even cites 
1 Cor 15:50 in support, stating that “flesh and blood shall not inherit 
the kingdom of God” (Gos. Phil. 56.29–34).28  Nevertheless, the 
Gospel of Philip still argues that a resurrection of the flesh—and 
even of “this flesh”—is absolutely necessary, because “everything is 
                                                 
28 Already Irenaeus complained that 1 Cor 15:50 was a passage that was 
“adduced by all the heretics in support of their folly,” namely “that the 
handiwork of God is not saved” (Haer. 5.9.1). Irenaeus’s own solution was 
that, while flesh and blood shall not inherit, they shall be inherited—by the 
Spirit (Haer. 5.9.1–4). 
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in it” (Gos. Phil. 57.18–19). The questions that need to be answered 
are thus, on the one hand, how to understand “everything” (ϩⲱⲃ 
ⲛ ⲙ), and on the other, what kind of flesh “this flesh” (ⲧⲉⲉ    ⲝ) is, if 
it is not the flesh of the mortal material body? 
The reference to nakedness is important, for it shows that the 
Gospel of Philip is using the common conceptual metaphor of the 
body as a garment. The opponents confronted by the Gospel of 
Philip who are afraid to arise naked, and who therefore believe in the 
resurrection of the material body, are wrong because they do not 
realize that there is not just one body, or one garment, but in fact 
two different ones. The other garment, which the Gospel of Philip 
holds to be essential for the resurrection, seems to be attainable only 
through the Eucharist, where we are told that one not only receives 
“food and drink,” but also a “garment” (Gos. Phil. 57.1–8). It is this 
“garment” that is to be understood as the resurrection body. This 
again implies that the resurrection body is here actually identical to 
the body of Christ, as received in the Eucharist, and what “It is 
necessary to arise in this flesh” means is that it is necessary to arise 
in the body—and flesh—of Christ. This is the flesh that will clothe 
the soul, which in the Gospel of Philip is associated with the Logos.  
The Gospel of Philip quotes 1 Cor 15:51, “Flesh [and blood] shall 
not inherit the kingdom [of God],” but proceeds to distinguish this 
flesh from another kind of flesh. The flesh that “shall not inherit” is 
identified as “this (flesh) which is on us,” while the flesh “that shall 
inherit” is “the flesh of Jesus and his blood” (Gos. Phil. 56.32–57.3). 
The “flesh of Jesus and his blood” are acquired by ingesting the 
eucharistic elements, which are further specified as the Logos and 
the Holy Spirit respectively: “His flesh is the Logos and his blood is 
the Holy Spirit” (Gos. Phil. 57.6–7). 
Now where does the Gospel of Philip actually stand in the 
resurrection debate? Cyril of Alexandria, like his predecessor 
Theophilus, as well as Epiphanius and Shenoute, all accuse Origen 
and his followers of denying bodily resurrection. As Cyril says in a 
letter to the monks of Scetis, “Such an evil doctrine is from the 
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madness of Origen” (Ep. 81.2 [= PG 77.373A]).29 This supposedly 
“Origenist” position is also confronted in the Gospel of Philip when 
it argues against the statement that “the flesh will not arise.” It is 
notable and striking that in refuting this position the Gospel of 
Philip presents a solution similar to that given by Epiphanius against 
Origen in chapter 64 of his Panarion, where he affirms the 
resurrection of a “spiritual body” with “spiritual flesh,” against 
Origen’s notion of a resurrection of the soul (Pan. 64.63.14–64.8). 
Moreover, both the Gospel of Philip and Epiphanius connect this 
“spiritual” flesh to the body of Christ. It was the spiritual nature of 
Christ’s post-resurrection flesh, Epiphanius explains, that made it 
possible for him to walk through closed doors (Pan. 64.64.2–9). 
 
V. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We have seen in the examples given here that while bodily integrity 
and continuity is stressed by some, others instead put the emphasis 
on transformation and difference. And while they work on the basis 
of certain shared assumptions, they interpret them differently. The 
insistence on the absolute integrity of the body in the resurrection, 
which is so clear in Shenoute, becomes even clearer in later Coptic 
texts, such as the pseudo-Athanasian homily On the Resurrection of 
Lazarus, which goes to great lengths in describing in detail the 
physical processes of the decomposition and subsequent reanimation 
of Lazarus’s body.30 In a way, what this pseudo-Athanasian text is 
doing is elaborating—in the extreme—on the example of Lazarus 
given by Shenoute in his anti-Origenist argument for the 
resurrection of the body in Who Speaks Through the Prophet, when 
he asks: “Was it not the smelly body that arose?” (ZM 63).31  
In the examples given above, it is evident that we are witnessing 
different, and even clashing, cognitive models. As we have seen, 
resurrection was understood in terms of the metaphors of the seed 
                                                 
29 Translations of Cyril are from McEnerney (1987). 
30 For an edition of this text, see Bernardin (1940). For a recent discussion 
of it, see Brakke (2000). 
31 Coptic text in Munier 1916, 136. 
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and the plant, pregnancy and birth, and an implicit sleep and 
awakening model. In addition, we have seen the importance of the 
metaphor of the body as a garment. Not only do these different 
conceptual metaphors work in different ways and promote different 
understandings of the nature of the resurrection and the resurrection 
body (cf. Bynum 1995, 6–7), but the metaphors themselves could be 
utilized in different ways to promote different understandings of the 
degree of continuity, or integrity, of the resurrection body in relation 
to the mortal material body.  
In his use and explication of the seed and plant metaphor in 1 
Cor 15, Paul succeeded in highlighting both similarities and 
differences, both continuity and discontinuity, between the old and 
the new body, while simultaneously stressing the transformation 
from the one to the other. According to Paul, the seed dies before 
the plant sprouts, and there is little resemblance between the two. 
We have seen that Shenoute, in Who Speaks Through the Prophet, 
opposes what seems to be an understanding of the resurrection that 
sticks very closely to the seed and plant metaphor as it is used by 
Paul. Indeed, Shenoute even reports that his interlocutor believes 
that a new body “will sprout up from” the dead body, just like a 
plant from a seed. Shenoute reports, however, that this is in 
opposition to Paul’s own understanding of the implications of the 
metaphor since his opponent disputes Paul’s claim that the seed has 
to die before the plant can emerge.  
Shenoute himself, however, while acknowledging the importance 
of transformation, still seems to reason more along the lines of an 
implicit sleep-and-awakening model, with clear continuity between 
the dead body and the resurrected body. Clearly Shenoute’s model 
stresses continuity to a much higher degree than Paul does in 1 Cor 
15,32 where the latter reckons with different bodies, different flesh, 
and different glories to an extent not picked up on by Shenoute. The 
archimandrite is highly aware of Paul’s terminology, but for him 
transformation from a psychic to a spiritual body does not seem to 
involve anything more radical than the purging of sin: While the 
                                                 
32 On Paul’s metaphor of the seed, see Bynum 1995, 3–6. 
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psychic body, like the bodies of Adam and Eve, is subject to sin, the 
spiritual body is free from it (Shenoute, Good is the Time for 
Launching a Boat to Sail). 
In addition to Scripture, the creed also played an important role 
in the debate. This is hardly surprising. By the early fifth century, 
“Not only would the validity of doctrinal propositions by this time be 
measured against the creed as an authoritative norm in general,” 
notes Thomas Graumann (2009, 545–46), “but theological reasoning 
would often also be based directly upon it. Theological treatises 
attempted an exegesis of the creed and interpreted its wording 
almost like Scripture.” We have seen that Rufinus did this, and we 
see it clearly in the Gospel of Philip. Creedal statements serve as the 
basis for theological reasoning and polemic (Lundhaug 2010, 2013). 
In the period when the Nag Hammadi Codices were manufactured, 
there is nothing surprising about this—it was common practice.33 
Statements concerning the resurrection are found in many creeds 
and professions of faith made in connection with baptism. As Cyril 
of Alexandria puts it in a letter to the monks of Scetis: “They say that 
some of those among you deny the resurrection of human bodies, 
which is part of our confession of faith, made when we go forward to 
our saving baptism. When we are confessing the faith, we add that 
we also believe in the resurrection of the flesh” (Ep. 81.1 [= PG 
77.372D–373A]). In this way, denials of bodily resurrection, and 
denials of the resurrection of flesh were curtailed. Nevertheless, in 
another letter to the monks Cyril laments the fact that some people 
misinterpret the words of the creed. He has been made aware, he 
                                                 
33 “From about the second half of the fourth century, concern with creed 
spilled over from the sphere of specialized debate to a wider audience and into 
liturgical and homiletical contexts. Catechetical instructions began to include 
explanations of the creed’s central theological tenets, and its recitation became 
a feature in the context of preparation for baptism” (Graumann 2009, 546). 
Instruction in key points of doctrine, including memorization of the creed, 
was an important part of the pre-baptismal preparations in this period, and 
some kind of creedal interrogation (redditio symboli) was an integral part 
of the initiatory process (see Finn 1992, 4–5), the relevance of which we 
will see below.  
 
Lundhaug, “Tell Me What Shall Arise” 
 - 231 - 
says, of the fact that “some are diverting what is in the creed into a 
channel which is not the proper one either because they do not 
understand the meaning of the words in it or because they are 
carried away to wrong thinking by an inclination toward the writings 
of certain men” (Ep. 55.7 [= PG 77.293C]). 
In light of Cyril’s concern and Rufinus’s reference to creedal 
formulations on the resurrection in his defense against the 
accusations of Jerome, it is interesting to note that the Gospel of 
Philip in fact stresses the importance of no less than a resurrection 
“in this flesh,” while still maintaining that what actually rises is a 
flesh that is different from the material one—exactly the kind of 
reinterpretation of dogmatic vocabulary that Cyril accuses certain 
monks of doing, and which Rufinus is accused of, but claims not to 
be doing. Some years earlier, Epiphanius also complained about 
prominent “Origenist” ascetics in Egypt who twisted the meaning of 
the resurrection of the flesh, “and say there is a resurrection of our 
flesh, yet not this (flesh), but another in its place” (Anc. 82.3).34  
We have seen several sources that oppose the “Origenist” model 
of the resurrection of a disembodied soul or spirit, but no text that 
advocates it. While both the Treatise on the Resurrection and the 
Gospel of Philip clearly oppose the idea of a resurrection of a 
material body, they still advocate the need for a body of flesh in the 
resurrection, albeit one consisting of a very different kind of flesh. 
But then even Origen himself talks about the necessity of a proper 
resurrection body, fit for heaven, rather than a resurrection of a 
disembodied soul.  
                                                 
34 Questions concerning the resurrection stayed on the agenda in Egypt for 
a long time, and “Origenist” views remained a concern well into the fifth 
century, as attested by Shenoute and others. The discussions of these matters 
reflected in the Gospel of Philip and the Treatise on the Resurrection are, 
regardless of the dates of authorship of their hypothetical originals, very much 
at home in the context of the Origenist controversy in Egypt in the late fourth 
and early fifth centuries, in the probable time and place of the manuscripts in 
which they have been preserved. 
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The debate over the resurrection body did not take place in a 
vacuum. There were certain, albeit shifting, parameters that had to 
be taken into account by everyone. In the various examples given 
here, we have seen that creedal statements and key scriptural 
passages not only defined the boundaries of the debate, but also 
constituted key building blocks with which competing 
conceptualizations of the resurrection were constructed. We have 
seen that a major difficulty confronting those who took part in the 
resurrection debate was how to make sense of Paul’s rather 
confusing explanation in 1 Cor 15, and getting it to fit with other 
biblical passages, creedal formulations, and their own preferred 
conceptual metaphors. The solutions we have seen here all try to 
account for continuity and transformation, the change from a 
psychic to a spiritual body, and the importance of the flesh, but in 
distinctly different ways. The challenge facing them consisted in 
making sense of key biblical texts together with the creed in ways 
that conformed to their preferred cognitive models of the 
resurrection, and they came up with very different ways of doing so.  
On the level of phrases, terminology, and allusions there is much 
agreement in the treatment of the resurrection between the various 
texts discussed in this essay, but there are also important 
disagreements regarding how to conceptualize it, leading to 
distinctly different interpretations. While creeds were introduced to 
curtail certain interpretations, attempts to narrow down interpretive 
possibilities by specifying creedal wording had only limited success, 
and indeed contributed to the creation of new interpretations as 
creedal phrases were simply redefined and reinterpreted to suit the 
preferred conceptual models of the interpreters. 
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